There are scientists who talk about a “theory
of everything” although it turns out they do not literally mean a theory of “everything”.
There are others who have claimed that science can basically supply the correct
answer to any correctly formulated question (at least any question worth
asking). This is sometimes tempered to the view that science provides, at least
in principle, an approach that can rigorously establish the truth about a given
state of affairs even if in practice it’s currently difficult to see how. At
one point it looked as though this was becoming a dominant view. Proponents of
this sort of view, passionately and (usually) elegantly expressed, were the
likes of Dawkins, Hitchens, Dennett and Harris. Let us call them collectively
Ditchkinetteris (with apologies to Terry Eagleton who coined the term Ditchkins
to refer to two of them; 1). As an aside, the power of this sort of view seems
to be in decline, as I have discussed previously. In general, Ditchkinetteris’s
take might be termed the sufficiency of science (SoS for short). It would be
wrong to assume that SoS was ever a majority view even among scientists,
although such things are hard to establish, erm… scientifically. It was
certainly a minority view among philosophers (eg see Kaufman’s review of Harris’
“The Moral Landscape”;2). But SoS has now been implicitly undermined but one of
its former (if only tacit) supporters, the journal Nature.
Nature published an editorial on the 27th
February entitled: “A code of ethics to get scientists talking”. This reports
on a document produced by a group of scientists convened by the World Economic
Forum and heartily recommends it. As the editorial points out, such codes are
not new in science. Many funding and governmental bodies have their own codes.
Interestingly the editorial claims that there’s a problem getting scientist to
take them seriously and adhere to them. But what intrigues me is the question
of what kind of thing is this code?
If SoS is true, then presumably such
codes will be scientific. That would mean they would consist of hypotheses,
predictions, experiments, results and conclusions. Or if not hypothesis driven
(because not all science fits this pattern comfortably) they would consist of
observations, measurements and conclusions. But there will be measurements and data,
there will be stats, there will be theory; all the familiar elements of
science. Right? Wrong. Actually what the particular code referred to consists
of (and this would be true of all the other codes) are well meaning, sensible
and pretty obvious advice about the kind of things we expect of responsible
science. For example, responsible science seeks to minimise harm to citizens. Such
a rule doesn’t appear to be scientific rule. It’s sensible, it’s the kind of
thing tax payers expect, but it is not itself a scientific statement or a scientific
rule. It’s the kind of thing I’d be happy to adhere to, as would all my
colleagues, and practically any scientist anywhere I know of. But it’s not
science.
The reasons given for why such a code is
necessary are also interesting. It is valuable because “the code contextualizes
natural sciences in a time of rapid technological change and popular
questioning of expertise.” Not sure I understand the first point, but the questioning
of expertise is familiar enough. The proponents of the code want to meet such
questioning by “infusing research with “the most
irreproachable behaviours”. But again, these are not scientific
statements or aims, laudable though they may be. They depend on historical,
sociological and ethical analysis, not science. So to properly practice
science, we must look outside science, indeed our conduct must be ruled by
principles which are not themselves scientific principles. This seems to be a
blow against SoS.
Of course SoS never was
true. Science always stood on foundations that were not themselves scientific. Principles,
assumptions and commitments always lurked in the background that were rarely
talked about. We all have them, use them and depend on them, and we’ve always
known it. It was Bacon who suggested that we ought to purge ourselves of such “idols”
in 1620, only for Kant to argue in the 18th century that some of
them are built into the very structure of our minds, they are wired in. Better
to be aware of them, and control them, than deny that they exist at all.
Personally, I’ve always
tried to be clear about my prior commitments. I’m drawn to science because it
tackles an ordered universe in an ordered way. That order flows from the God
who made the universe, and has sustained it ever since. He is the ultimate
source of truth, so I only progress because He reveals His truth as I employ
the tools that science provides, allied to the tools that He has provided. He also
reveals His truth to others, even although they do not recognise Him or
acknowledge Him in any way (indeed many of them are much better at this science
game than me). I study the book of His works, and “think God’s thoughts after
Him” (to slightly misquote Kepler).
While I’m actually running
an experiment, collecting and analysing data, drawing inferences from it,
accepting or rejecting hypotheses, I behave (and probably look) like a
naturalist. I explain my results, accept or reject my hypotheses, in terms of mechanisms
that are familiar in the field. But ultimately, on reflection, I know it is Him
I’m studying. Because of that, I want to do it in way that honours rather than
dishonours Him, just like the Christian
plumber, carpenter, bus driver, dentist or lawyer. I don’t work to please my
boss, or the head of my Institution, or really for the good of the community or
for the honour of science. All of these things are good things to do. But they
are secondary. My aim is to “serve wholeheartedly as if (I) were serving the
Lord, not men” (Ephesians 6:7). All these are prior, outside commitments. But
it turns out it’s not just me that has them, indeed needs them, because science
is insufficient. At least I’m (reasonably) coherent about it.
1. Eagleton, T. (2009) Reason, faith and revolution: reflections on the God debate. Yale University Press.
2. Kaufman, WRP (2012) Can science determine moral value? A reply to Sam Harris. Neuroethics 5:55-65.
